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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
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plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
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applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
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The Business Case Analysis (BCA) is regarded as a highly-useful management tool.  
BCAs are mandatory, among other things, for formulating Product Support Strategies (PSSs) in 
the development of major systems.  While defense managers appear to have sufficient 
guidance regarding BCA documentation, a comparable level of guidance regarding analytical 
methods is not evident.  In fact, there is extant OSD guidance which leaves analytical methods 
as a task for the services.  Accordingly, this essay addresses theoretical foundations useful for 
BCAs, and practical foundations for analysis in the defense arena—with special attention to the 
choice of contractor vs. organic support in the formulation of Product Support Strategies (PSSs).  
The report concludes with a proposed partnership involving the Navy with the defense academic 
and analytical communities.  It also offers words of advice based on current state-of-the-art for 
Program Managers doing BCAs assessing contractor vs. organic support. 
Keywords: Business Case Analysis (BCA), Product Support Strategies (PSS), Program 
Management, Contracts, Outsourcing, Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), Transactions Cost 
Economics (TCE). 
Introduction 
Chapter 1.  Introduction and Overview 
Business cases and Business Case Analyses (BCAs) have become a fact of life for DoD 
Program Managers.  Used well, they can do much to make sense of the very difficult 
environment of contemporary defense management.  Defense decision-making must take into 
account a threat environment that has become increasingly difficult.  We’ve traded the 
insecurities of the Cold War, along with the analytical comforts of dealing with one main enemy 
for a more favorable military balance, along with a multiplicity of national security concerns.  
Included are terrorism, drug trafficking, and the rise of new powers (China, India, Brazil, …).   
Related to the changed environment are DoD initiatives toward “transformation” of 
military forces for more effectiveness in the new national security environment.  Accordingly, to 
take one example, the Navy finds itself considering a large number of new classes of warships 
as candidates for development.  At the same time, funding is scarce and so is end-strength—
while operating and personnel tempos are very high.   
In an era of new complexities, new mandates, and worrisome resource constraints, it’s 
especially important that defense managers of all types, but Program Managers especially, 
make resource-allocation decisions informed by solid analysis.  BCAs are intended to provide 
that basis. 
There’s much useful guidance regarding the major steps to doing a BCA, and, with it, 
useful templates for producing one.  However, there is much less that’s visible regarding the 
methodological foundations that make BCAs analyses and not just reports and briefings.  In 
fact, one authoritative DoD source (Wynne) explicitly leaves development of analytical methods 
to the services.  Accordingly, this study reports on analytical foundations of useful and effective 
Business Case Analyses.  There is, however, a focus (sometimes implicit) on analytical 
methods useful for making organic vs. contractor support decisions, as part of choosing the best 
Product Support Strategy (PSS) for a new system.   
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Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical foundations of methods useful for BCAs.  It starts 
(Section 2A) with a general discussion of problem-solving methods, and states a theme that 
runs throughout this discussion.  Next, 2B is Input-Output Analysis, a method of tracing the 
interdependencies of complex economies, with obvious applications (potentially) to complex 
organizations such as the US Navy.  The central idea is that outsourcing decisions reduce 
military manpower requirements directly in the activity that was outsourced, but also indirectly in 
the support structure for those personnel.  Following, 2C is Transactions Cost Economics 
(TCE), a relatively recent branch of economic theory.  It starts with the notion that markets are 
not frictionless media, and that activities in any market have associated costs (called 
“transactions costs”).  Therefore, while outsourcing promises savings in production costs, it 
involves greater participation in market activities—and increases transactions costs.  Moreover, 
TCE strongly indicates that the size of the transactions costs is highly sensitive to the nature of 
the outsourcing action.  Finally, 2D is Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA).  BCAs are intended to find 
best-value solutions, and cost benefit analysis is a highly-developed analytical method to find 
best value (defined as “benefits minus costs”). 
Chapter 3 considers some practical foundations for putting such analysis into Business 
Case Analysis.  Section 3A considers BCAs, as currently viewed by DoD, and discusses their 
nature, intent, and capabilities.  Next, 3B lists defense-related methods which are conceptually 
akin to the input-output perspective—DRM for costs (3.B.1.) and Navy manpower calculations 
with supporting data bases (3.B.2.).  Both are described and assessed.  The tentative 
conclusion is that neither is well designed to support determination of the indirect manpower 
effects of outsourcing actions.  Also, in all likelihood, they cannot be made to do so in a timely 
manner (even as a special project).  (Testing that proposition would be an interesting topic for 
further research, but is outside this project’s scope.)  Finally, Section 3C considers outsourcing 
methods.  The A-76 process is discussed in Section 3.C.1.  Also, a risk-assessment method for 
outsourcing actions arising from a recent NPS thesis (Powell) is summarized (3.C.2.). 
This report concludes with Chapter 4.  This section sketches out a proposed research 
program to carry out the Navy’s mandate to develop analytical foundations for BCAs.  It also 
offers some interim thoughts on how to frame the choice between organic and contractor 
support for new systems. 
Chapter 2.  Theoretical Foundations 
2A. Structuring and Solving Problems 
A Method for Structuring and Solving Problems 
Finding the best (or least bad) solution to a problem with significant stakes attached 
warrants careful and systematic attention to fully understanding the problem itself; identifying 
and developing alternatives for its solution, determining with reasonable completeness the 
consequences associated with each alternative, assessing those consequences, and, finally, 
using that analysis to make a decision or recommendation.1 
1. Understand the problem.  Recognizing there is a difficult problem and having 
considerable relevant expertise does not guarantee sufficient understanding to reach the best 
                                                
1 This discussion borrows heavily from Stokey and Zeckhauser.  However, that approach is not the only effective 
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solution.  It’s important first to thoroughly understand the context.  To take a very simple 
example, suppose our “problem” is to insert a fastener in a block of wood.  If at first inspection 
the fastener appears to be a nail, it is natural to consider alternatives that involve hammers.  If a 
closer look reveals the fastener is a screw, then it’s apparent the hammers in our toolbox are 
less useful than the appropriate screwdriver.2  That is, lack of understanding can greatly affect 
the solution. 
A related issue of perhaps greater importance is the understanding of objectives.  What 
do we want to accomplish?  Are we willing to cut back in achieving one objective for the sake of 
better meeting another?  Perception of objectives can and does affect the nature of solutions.  
Suppose, for example, customers must frequently wait to be served at our facility.  This is 
causing considerable dissatisfaction among those in our clientele who can and will take their 
business elsewhere.  If we define our objective as reducing wait time, we will consider solutions 
that increase ability to quickly take care of customers when they arrive.  If we define our 
objective as (more generally) increasing customer satisfaction, we might also consider solutions 
that make waiting for service less irksome.   
Likewise, if we decide in the interests of economy, or effective support, to consider 
outsourcing certain functions, then it’s important to fully understand the context.  What does the 
function in question do for the organization?  Who’s affected by the quality of performance?  
Affected in what way?  We can then more completely define the tasks to be accomplished and 
the relevant standards of performance.3 
2. Develop Alternatives.  If we understand the problem, then we can consider useful 
ways to solve (or at least mitigate) it.  Typically, a number of alternatives are available.  They 
are best understood as “courses of action” or “programs,” not as titles.  It is accordingly useful to 
develop (as outlines) alternatives suitable for plans which might actually be executed, rather 
than as entries on a briefing chart. 
3. Predict consequences associated with each alternative.  Consequences typically are 
manifest in both effectiveness (what’s gained) and costs (what’s given up or risks incurred).  
While alternatives in real problems have a large number of consequences, some tell more about 
achieving the objectives than others.  In many complex problems, prediction involves modeling, 
a formal process of relating key features of the alternatives to their important consequences.   
4. Assess the consequences associated with the alternatives.  This may be relatively 
easy or quite difficult.  Alternatives which are less effective and more costly than others are said 
to be “dominated” and are not candidates for implementation.  Similarly, if all available 
alternatives are equally costly (or equally effective), then the most effective (or least costly) 
alternative is clearly best.   
Other comparisons are more difficult.  If Alternative A is both more costly and more 
effective than B, then sorting between the two entails further analysis.  Available methods 
include multi-attribute utility or cost-benefit analysis.4  In choosing between two support 
                                                
2 An extensive repertoire of problem-solving methods is also valuable.  “If all you’ve got is a hammer, everything 
looks like a nail,” is an old saying with considerable truth. 
3 This is not new information for those who have participated in outsourcing studies. 
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alternatives, such as organic and contractor, a well-crafted statement of work can facilitate 
comparison based on equal effectiveness. 
5. Make a decision or provide a recommendation.  In many respects, this phase of the 
process involves reconsideration and review of the entire process, especially the quality and 
relevance of the analysis.  It’s useful to consider whether further iterations of the process are 
useful.5  If our analysis includes assumed, or baseline, values of key parameters, it’s important 
to consider how our results vary (if at all) with different values of those parameters (sensitivity 
analysis).   
When we’re convinced our reasoning is sound, that further analysis will not improve the 
quality of our conclusions, or we’ve just run out time, it’s appropriate to make our best decision, 
or make our best recommendation to the decision makers.6 
2B. Input-Output Analysis 
Input-output analysis originated as a method of studying the operations of an entire 
economy.  It postulates a number of sectors (or industries) and a number of primary factors of 
production (the most important being labor).7  The primary factors (or inputs) support the various 
industries.  Industries support each other; intermediate goods flow within industries and 
between industries.  Thus, for example, a finished automobile may have an engine supplied by 
another automobile firm, and tires purchased from the rubber products industry.  Every primary 
input is supplied to the goods-producing sectors.  For example, labor services are part of every 
industry’s production process. 
Industries also supply goods and services that directly enhance society’s material well-
being.  This is called “final demand.”  A van delivered to a household is part of final demand, 
while a van supplied to a delivery service is a shipment to another industry. (Some of the latter 
van’s deliveries are eventually part of final demand.)   
There are some relationships which are always true in this model.  First, the sum of 
deliveries from each industry to final demand plus all deliveries to other industries adds up to 
total output of that industry.  If there are m industries (or sectors) in an economy, then: 
Qi = qi1 + qi2 + ….. + qim  + Fi = qij
m
j
Σ=1  + Fi, where i = 1, …, m,  (2.B.1) 
where Qi is Industry I’s total (or gross) output, qij is deliveries from the i-th industry to the j-th, 
and Fi is deliveries from the ith industry to final demand.   
Standard input-output analysis assumes that every unit of Industry J’s output entails a 
specific amount of output from Industry I.  For example, it’s safe to say that new automobiles 
                                                
5 The process outlined here is inherently iterative.  Analysis may lead directly to a conclusion.  It might also surface 
insights that warrant further analysis.  If, for example, a new alternative surfaces, then it’s appropriate to go back to 
the second step, developing alternatives, and re-accomplish part of the problem-solving process. 
6 The time dimension is not trivial in problem-solving processes.  In particular, a good decision (or recommendation) 
that’s timely is better than a decision that’s perfect but too late. 
7 Excellent discussions of input-output analysis are available in Henderson and Baumol. 
 =
=
===================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=íÜÉ=ÑçìåÇ~íáçå=Ñçê=áååçî~íáçå======== - 239 - 
=
=
include five tires (with rare exceptions with more)—which are almost always a delivery from one 
industry to another.  Thus: 
Qi = ai1 Q1 + ai2 Q2 + …. aim Qm + Fi = Qa jij
m
j
Σ=1  + Fi,   (2.B.2) 
where aij is the deliveries from Industry I associated with each unit of Industry J’s output, and 
other terms are defined as in Equation (2.B.1). 
Frequently, these relationships are summarized in an input-output table that looks 
something like Table 2.B.1 below.  The economy represented has m industries and r primary 
inputs.  For the simple case of two industries and one primary input (usually labor), we have the 
situation described in Table 2.B.2.   
Table 2.B.1.  An Input-Output Table 
Sectors 1 …j m Final Demand Total Output 
1 a11 a1j a1m F1 Q1 
…i ai1 aij * aim Fi Qi 
m am1 amj amm Fm Qm 
Primary Inputs      
m+1 am+1,1 am+1,j am+1,m --- --- 
… am+i,1 am+i,j am+i,m --- --- 
m+r am+r,1 am+r,j am+r,m --- --- 
* Note: each unit of output for Industry J entails aij units of Industry I output. 
Table 2.B.2.  Input-Output Table with Two Sectors and One Primary Input8 
Sectors 1 2 Final Demand Total Output 
1 .2 .4 F1 Q1 
2 .6 .3 F2 Q2 
Primary Input     
3 .2 .3 --- --- 
 
As noted above, the following must be true for the simple economy of Table 2B.2: 
Q1 = .2 Q1 + .4 Q2 + F1 
Q2 = .6 Q1 + .3 Q2 + F2.        (2.B.3) 
If we know final demands (the F’s) and the technical characteristics of the economy (the 
a’s), then we can find the total output for each industry (the Q’s).  Thus, 
Q1 = 2.1875 F1 + 1.25 F2 
Q2 = 1.875 F1 + 2.5 F2.        (2.B.4) 
Also, the primary input needed turns out to be  
                                                
8 Taken from Henderson. 
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Q3 = .2 Q1 + .3 Q2 = .2 (2.1875F1+1.25F2) + .3(1.875F1+2.5 F2)  = F1+F2.  (2.B.5) 
A Military Input-Output Model 
A simple input-output model based on the military establishment is more hierarchical, 
and also simpler.  Suppose we have three sectors: “capability” (or operations), designated C, 
direct support, designated S, and infrastructure, designated I.  In addition, there is a fourth 
variable: personnel (or manpower), designated P.  Our input-output model would then look 
something like Table 2.B.3. 
This model is hierarchical, as indicated.  There are the four sectors indicated above.  
The Capabilities Sector makes “deliveries” only to “Final Demand” (or operational capabilities) 
and the Capabilities Sector itself.  The Support Sector provides support for the Capabilities 
Sector and itself.  The Infrastructure sector makes deliveries to the Capabilities and Support 
Sectors, as well as itself.  Finally, the Personnel Sector supports all the other sectors, as well as 
itself.9  Labor, or personnel, is shown as a sector instead of a primary factor since it provides 
support to itself in the form of personnel support, or overhead. 
Table 2.B.3.  A Military Input-Output Model 
“Sectors” C S I P Final Demand Total Output 
Capability (C) aCC 0 0 0 FC QC 
Support (S) aSC aSS 0 0 0 QS 
Infrastructure 
(I) 
aIC aIS aII 0 0 QI 
Personnel (P) aPC aPS aPI aPP 0 M 
*Note: Qk is total output for Sector k.  FC is total operational capabilities. 
If we include the complication of using contractor services in lieu of organic activities 
(except for the Capability Sector), we now have total sector outputs as follows: 
QC = (1-aCC) QC + FC 
QS  = QSO + CS = aSC QC + aSS QS  
QI = QIO + CI = aIC QC + aIS QS + aII QI 
P = PO + CP = aPC QC + aPS QS + aPI  QI + aPP PO,    (2.B.6) 
where PO is total military personnel, P is total personnel billet-equivalents (from organic or 
contractor sources) and Ck is contractor services provided in Sector K (to include personnel 
services).  It’s useful to remember that some inter-sector “deliveries” take the form of goods and 
services provided to support each sector’s productive activities, and some involve support of the 
military personnel in those sectors.  Hence, deliveries from the personnel sector involve, for 
example, people on operational unit rolls and the overhead personnel which support them. 
                                                
9 Because the Personnel sector provides support for itself, the model has been reformulated.  Table 2.B.3 is a 
“closed” input-output model; the models summarized in Tables 2.B.1 and 2.B.2 are “open.” 
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We can solve the system of equations stated in (2.B.6) above: 
QC = FC/(1-aCC)        (2.B.7.1) 
QSO = FC * {aSC / [(1-aCC)(1- aSS)]} - CS     (2.B.7.2) 
QIO = FC * {[aSC aIS + aIC (1 - aSS)} / {(1-aCC) (1-aSS) (1-aII)} - CI  (2.B.7.3) 
PO = {FCaPC/[(1-aCC)(1-aPP)]} + {FC(aPSaSC)/[(1-aCC)(1-aSS)(1-aII)} 
+ {FCaPIaIC/[(1-aCC)(1-aSS)(1-aII)]}  
+ {FCaPIaISaSC/[(1-aCC)(1-aSS)(1-aII)(1-aPP)]} – CP/(1-aPP)  (2.B.7.4) 
The results stated in Equations (2.B.7.1) – (2.B.7.4) are consistent with intuition.  Total 
level of activities in the Capabilities Sector depends directly on operational capabilities delivered 
(FC).  The appropriate levels of activity in the Support and Infrastructure Sectors depend on final 
operational capabilities required and the extent to which organic activities (subscripted O) is 
replaced directly by contractor support activities (CS and CI).   
The solution for PO is more conveniently stated as:  
PO = {[aPCQC + aPSQS + aPIQI]/(1-aPP)} – {[aPSCS+aPICI+CP]/(1-aPP)} (2.B.8) 
This model indicates there are both direct and indirect military manpower reductions 
possible with contractor support.  Directly, contractor support leads to replacements in organic 
manpower in the affected organization; indirectly, there is a reduction in the personnel support 
tail.  Associated with military personnel billets are support personnel—recruiting, training, 
personnel, administration of pay, public works, etc.   
In particular, there is a “mulitiplier” of personnel reductions possible with contractor 
support: 
dPO/dCS = -aPS/(1-aPP), dPO/dCI = -aPI/(1-aPP), and dPO/dCP = -1/(1-aPP). (2.B.9) 
That is, every direct reduction in military personnel billets results in additional reductions 
because of decreased personnel support needs.  For example, contractor services replacing 
support activities (CS) lead to direct replacement of (aPS CS) the number of military billets.  At 
the same time, there is a corresponding reduction in support billets associated with the 
personnel directly replaced.  There is also a reduction in support billets associated with the 
original support billets reduced, and so on.  The multiplier for total personnel reductions vs. 
direct reductions is 1/(1-aPP). 10  
                                                
10 Suppose 100 military billets are associated with a set of activities, and that five such billets entail one personnel 
support billet (aPP = 0.2).  Thus, 100 military billets entail 20 personnel support billets; those 20 billets, in turn, require 
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Certainly, contractor personnel have some sort of support “tail” as well, which includes 
recruiting, training, human resources services, administration of pay, medical care, etc.  These 
needs are similar to those of military personnel.  However, support of contractor personnel is 
reflected in the contractor’s proposal.  It is not readily visible in the contractor support alternative 
for DoD decision making. 
Hence, the military input model above indicates there are real savings in personnel 
support, above and beyond those not directly involved in the organic support alternative.   
2C. Transactions Cost Economics 
There is a private-sector counterpart to the choice of support-service sourcing with 
organic assets or contractors.  It has become a standard part of economic theory.  The seminal 
work is generally acknowledged as coming from Ronald Coase in 1937.  If most productive 
tasks can be accomplished with greater efficiency elsewhere, then what reason would firms in 
search of profit have to produce those goods and services within the enterprise boundaries?11  
The answer to the question is that going to the market to acquire such goods and services 
carries with it certain “transactions costs,” which might well turn out to be greater than the added 
costs associated with production in-house.12  Thus, study of make-or-buy decisions and similar 
issues is often called “transactions cost economics.”   
More generally, the make-or-buy decision is considered part of the issue of the firm’s 
“vertical” boundaries.  This is a standard topic in economics texts, especially those with a 
managerial bent.13  The productive processes associated with bringing a good to market are 
viewed as being a chain of activities, or a series of vertical steps.  One such representation 
appears in Besanko (2000, p. 111) and is shown in Table 2.C.1 below. 
Table 2.C.1. A Vertical Chain of Production 
PRODUCTION PROCESSES SUPPORT PROCESSES 
Raw inputs (e.g., trees, iron, cows) Accounting 
Transportation and Storage Finance 
Intermediate goods producers (e.g., lumber mills, 
steel manufacturers, metalworking shops, tanneries) 
Human Resources Management and 
Support 
Transportation and Storage Legal Support 
Furniture Manufacturers Marketing 
Transportation and Storage Planning 
Retail Outlets Other Support Activities 
 
                                                
11 In more modern terms, one would expect businesses to restrict production to their core competencies and acquire 
the other parts of their products from outside suppliers.  Thus, one would, for example, expect an automobile 
manufacturer to accomplish the final assembly of the cars it sells, but acquire tires from outside companies.  These 
seem to be fairly clear-cut decisions.  A question with a less obvious answer is the car’s windshield. 
12 To use a physical analog, the market is not a frictionless medium.  Operations in the marketplace require 
expenditure of time, resources, and management attention. 
13 Besanko and Rubin. 
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Furniture carpentry, for instance, is relatively uncomplicated.  It can be represented as a 
series of steps, or stages, of production.  A more complex production process might appear 
more like a PERT chart.  In any case, every firm in this industry must decide how much of those 
production and support processes will be conducted within the boundaries of the firm, and how 
much will be performed within other enterprises. 
Disadvantages Of Organic Assets 
Lost Economies in Production. Firms specialize in certain goods and services because 
they are particularly good at performing them.  (Also, as firms specialize, they increase their 
proficiency at certain processes and become even better.)  Within a competitive market, firms 
are highly motivated to operate at the most efficient scale.14  Furthermore, competitive markets 
provide powerful incentives for the participating firms to produce a least-cost product mix both to 
enhance profit and fend off rivals.  That is, firms in a competitive market are also motivated to 
fully realize economies of scope.15  Finally, such firms are engaged in production continuously 
(more or less) and are thus well positioned to achieve economies available from learning; they 
can move down whatever learning curve applies and stay there.  Furthermore, outside firms in a 
competitive market are motivated to pass the savings to their customers.  Prices charged in 
competitive markets are close to marginal costs, which have been driven down as a result of 
exploiting available economies of scale, scope and learning.16 
Production of such items within the firm is unlikely to be as efficient.  In general, rates of 
production are too small to fully realize available economies of scale.  Only by happy 
coincidence would the firm’s demand for goods of a particular type correspond closely with the 
most efficient scale of production.  Likewise, the mix of products needed would correspond with 
available economies of scope only by coincidence.  Finally, in-house production may well 
operate only intermittently, which means less opportunities to exploit economies from learning 
by doing.17 
“Agency” Costs.  In addition, production in-house means an enterprise (or division) with 
a protected customer base.  There is, accordingly, less incentive to improve product quality or 
efficiency of production.  Basically, the problem is to make sure the in-house operation performs 
diligently and in ways consistent with the profitability of the larger enterprise.18  While 
management oversight can address these problems, it carries a cost.  Oversight requires time, 
                                                
14 Firms in perfectly competitive markets will move toward the lowest point of their average cost curve in pursuit of 
profit.  That is, these firms can be expected to take full advantage of economies of scale. 
15 If two products can be produced together more cheaply than they can be produced separately, then there are 
economies of scope.  Opportunities for economies of scale and scope pretty much define the firm’s natural “horizontal 
boundaries.” 
16 The difference between marginal cost and price varies inversely with the price elasticity of demand for the vendor’s 
product.  An inherent feature of competitive markets is the availability of a large number of close substitutes for any 
firm’s product.  Therefore, price elasticities of demand are quite high, and the difference between marginal cost and 
price are correspondingly quite small.  (In the limiting case of perfect competition, price elasticity of demand for any 
firm’s product is infinite, and price is equal to marginal cost.) 
17 With extended production runs, firms become more proficient with the processes involved, and therefore able to 
achieve lower cost. As Besanko (2000, p. 91) puts it, “cost advantages … Flow from accumulating experience and 
know-how.” 
18 This is frequently referred to as the “principal-agent problem.”  Methods to address it are sometimes grouped as 
“agency theory.”  See Kreps, Besanko. 
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effort and, therefore, commitment of resources.  Yet, outsourcing part of the production chain 
accordingly avoids agency costs. 
“Influence” Costs.  Production in-house also generally entails the corresponding division 
of the enterprise having a seat at the table for corporate decisions and strategy.  In all likelihood, 
the division will espouse policies and resource commitments that enhance its position and 
capabilities, and will likely oppose those which call for its dissolution.  The possible distortions of 
corporate decision-making (and attendant losses of competitiveness and profits) can be 
regarded as influence costs, and are worth consideration in organizing productive processes. 
Disadvantages Of Outsourcing 
Coordination Difficulties.  Efficient production requires extensive synchronization of a 
number of complex activities.  This is especially true in the practice of “lean” production, 
featuring “just-in-time” deliveries with attendant reduction in inventory costs.  Coordination with 
an outside enterprise may well prove more difficult than with an in-house division.  There is 
likely to be more commonality of objectives between two divisions of the same enterprise than 
with an outside firm.  Also, any disagreements about deliveries, schedules and similar issues 
are generally settled more quickly and in ways suitable to the enterprise if it has authority over 
all parties.  (One way to have that authority is to own all the divisions, i.e., to produce in-house.) 
Loss of Sensitive Information.  Enterprise operations involve information, some of which 
is proprietary, classified or otherwise sensitive.  Close coordination with an outside supplier of 
goods or services involves the exchange of information, some of which is sensitive.  Passing 
this information outside corporate boundaries accordingly lessens ability to control its 
dissemination.  Thus, involving outside suppliers involves risks of compromising corporate (or 
government) secrets. 
Transactions Costs.  Outsourcing important parts of one’s business means depending 
on the chosen supplier.  This dependence may be of trivial importance.  For example, purchase 
of paper clips involves a one-time transaction for office supplies.19  If a paper clip source proves 
unsatisfactory for some reason, it’s readily possible to find another supplier.  On the other hand, 
outsourcing a major management information system involves a long-term, highly-complicated 
relationship.  During the process of executing the agreement, the supplier acquires expertise in 
this particular system, which confers a market niche.  At some point, the relationship progresses 
from a customer entering a competitive marketplace with a number of suppliers to a relationship 
with one buyer and one qualified seller.  Thus, close-in bilateral bargaining replaces the 
impersonal (arms-length) arrangements of the competitive marketplace.  Outsourcing 
relationships of this nature entail a basic transformation from competitive bidder (prior to source 
selection) to monopolistic supplier (after source selection). 
Having one supplier with unique expertise provides monopoly power; there are no close 
substitutes for this particular contractor’s services.  Accordingly, the firm is now vulnerable to 
                                                
19 Actually, a series of one-time purchases of paper clips. 
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“opportunistic behavior”20 from the contractor.  Unforeseen circumstances may prompt large 
charges for special services for which there are no readily available substitutes.21 
The supplier may, in fact, exploit its power in the relationship to renegotiate the basic 
agreement to its disadvantage, threatening to dissolve the agreement.  In the Transactions Cost 
Economics literature, this is called a “holdup.”22   
Relationship-Specific Investments 
Frequently, an outsourcing arrangement involves enhancing or changing the capacity of 
the supplier to more effectively meet customer needs.  Investments can take on relation-specific 
qualities from some combination of characteristics, including the following: 
location: e.g., the supplier’s production facility is located close to its customer; 
physical assets: e.g., the supplier’s plant is specialized for the customer’s needs, and 
much less profitable if serving other customers; 
human assets: the supplier’s work force skill set is oriented toward the primary 
customer’s needs and is much less productive when dealing with other customers. 
Relation-specific investments facilitate economies in production because of the 
specialized capabilities involved.  They also increase risks to both parties.  The specialized 
supplier is more efficient in providing the outsourced component, and thus can potentially raise 
its price—and still remain the least-costly supplier.  At the same time, the supplier’s 
specialization makes it more vulnerable to its one customer.  The customer can potentially 
exploit the supplier’s dependence by lowering the price of the outsourced component.  That is, 
relation-specific investments increase the total gains from the outsourcing arrangement, but also 
increase risks of both parties to a holdup or to opportunistic behavior by their partners. 
Relation-Specific Investment And Potential For Holdup: A Hypothetical Example23 
Boutique Motor Corporation (BMC) features highly decorative cup holders in its 
automobiles.  General-purpose plastics suppliers can provide those unique cup holders for $4 
per unit.  BMC, however, forms a long-term relationship with Mom & Pop Plastic Fabricators 
(M&P) to get those cup holders at a cheaper price, say $3 per unit for 500,000 cup holders per 
year.  As part of its part of the relationship, M&P modifies (and specializes) its plastic molding 
machinery to make the distinctive BMC cup holder more efficiently.  M&P invests $1 million in 
the modifications, and can then produce each unit for $1 each.24  M&P’s modified plant can still 
produce general-purpose cup holders, but average variable cost goes up to $2.90 per unit with 
                                                
20 Williamson defines “opportunism” as “self-interest seeking with guile…” 
21 Besanko and others have labeled the transition from one prospective buyer and many sellers to one buyer and one 
seller, from competitive market to a one-on-one relationship as the “fundamental transformation.”  This transformation 
occurs, at least to a certain extent, after the completion of every source selection process. 
22 An even worse case is the possibility that a holdup might be unilaterally executed.  According to Besanko, “a 
holdup problem arises when a party in a contractual arrangement exploits the other party’s vulnerability due to 
relationship-specific assets.” 
23 Besanko has a similar example on page 153. 
24 Marginal Cost = Average Variable Cost = $1. 
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the special-purpose machinery.  The prevailing market price for general-purpose cup holders is 
$3 per unit. 
In this simple example, M&P’s costs are as follows: 
Total Cost = $140,000 + $1 * Q, 
where Q is annual production (500,000 for BMC), and annual payments of $140K will retire a 
debt of $1 million at 6.64% (APR) over ten years.  If M&P produces only for BMC, then total cost 
is $640,000.  Revenues from BMC are $1.5 million (500,000*3).   
Thus, M&P earns profits of $0.86 million per year as a result of the relationship with 
BMC; it would absorb losses of 90K per year if it diverted its production capacity to 500,000 
general-purpose cup holders.25  Likewise, BMC adds $0.5 million to its profits since it pays $3 
per unit for its cup holders, instead of $4 (500,000*[4-3]).  In short, the agreement provides 
significant benefits to both parties.  The total benefit (or “surplus”) is $1.45 million (.86+.09+.50) 
after the relationship between the two companies is formed. 
However, this total surplus can be contested.  Suppose BMC demands M&P lower its 
price to $2.  If that happens, then M&P’s profits decrease to $0.36 million (500,000*2 – 
640,000), and BMC’s profits increase by $0.50 million.  At the same time, M&P may insist on a 
price increase to $3.50 per unit.  If that happens, then M&P’s profit increases to $1.11 million, 
and BMCs benefit declines to $0.25 million.26  In short, BMC and M&P can dispute shares of the 
total benefit from the relationship.27  As indicated, the standard term for such attempts to alter 
the relationship is “holdup.” 
Addressing the “Holdup” Problem 
While corporate partnerships and relation-specific investments increase the benefits to 
both parties, they make both vulnerable to opportunistic behavior, or a holdup, by the other 
party.  Vulnerability to these events can be significantly decreased through well-crafted 
contracts.  However, contracting (a) involves expenditure of resources, and (b) cannot 
completely eliminate risks associated with opportunistic behavior from partners.28 
The process of contracting includes drafting the relevant documents, negotiating the 
version of the contract that is signed, taking actions to enforce that contract, and renegotiating 
when needed.  These tasks entail, at minimum, the services of skilled people who develop local 
                                                
25 Before making its relationship-specific investment (or prior to the transformation), M&P reckons its advantage as 
$0.86 million per year minus its profits as a general-purpose supplier.  After the investment, M&P’s benefit from the 
relationship with BMC is $.95 million per year with production of 500,000 per year.  (If M&P were to produce those 
cup holders at variable costs of $2.90 per unit and sell them at $3.00, it would incur a loss of $90K per year [revenue 
= $1.50 million; cost = $1.59 million]). 
26 It’s unlikely that a holdup by either party would be presented this crudely.  BMC might plead hard times and assert 
the need to negotiate lower prices from suppliers.  M&P might point to increases in input costs, and assert the need 
for a higher price in order to remain in its relationship with BMC. 
27 There are obvious limits to this behavior.  If M&P demands more than $4 for each cup holder, then BMC would find 
it advantageous to buy its cup holders from other sources (at $4).  Likewise, if BMC forces the price below $1.10, 
then M&P would choose to make general purpose cup holders and sell them for $3 per unit (at a unit cost of $2.90). 
28 Costs associated with contracting, and the holdup risks remaining are major components of what are generally 
termed “transactions costs.” 
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knowledge of the specific business relationship.  There may also be costs associated with 
litigation, to include both direct (e.g., monetary) and indirect (e.g., time delay) components.  
Furthermore, the basic contract may well need considerable administrative and management 
attention throughout its life, even if full-scale renegotiation is not undertaken.  Accomplishing 
these tasks satisfactorily involves expenditure of resources and management attention.  These 
“transactions” costs can negate a significant portion of the savings involved with outsourced 
production. 
The future is not amenable to perfect prediction—a well-known fact of life.  The obvious 
implication is that a contract cannot foresee all possible contingencies throughout the period of 
its execution.  That’s true regardless of the skill of the legal staff, and the expertise of the 
contracting personnel.29  In some cases, this is not worrisome, as, say, for the one-time 
purchase of paper clips.  However, in long-term, complex outsourcing relationships, this may 
prove very costly during the execution of the contract.   
This problem can be further complicated by asymmetric information.  Suppose that 
during contract negotiations between BMC and M&P, BMC is aware of a contingency in the 
execution of the contract that will give it scope for opportunistic behavior.  Suppose also that 
M&P is not aware of this.  BMC is unlikely to disclose this contingency during contract 
negotiations.30  Also, enforcement of clearly-written contracts may be problematic.  It may be 
difficult to specify, measure and demonstrate material breach of contract.  Furthermore, it is 
impossible to foresee all situations in which a contracting party might wish to demonstrate that 
breach. 
Because contracts cannot completely hedge against risks of opportunistic behavior, 
other risk reduction measures may prove advantageous.  The enterprise that’s outsourcing may 
retain some in-house (perhaps standby) capability to provide the good or service in question.31  
This, and similar measures, could enhance bargaining position in the event of renegotiation or 
contract-enforcement actions.  Changing the ownership of assets associated with relation-
specific investments could reduce the scope for opportunistic behavior; this may take the form 
of government-furnished equipment in federal transactions.  However, hedging measures also 
entail costs, and can likewise dissipate the potential gains from outsourcing. 
The Standard Bottom Line 
The conventional wisdom in the transactions costs literature is that the decision to 
outsource should not be taken lightly.  While the potential production-cost savings may well be 
tempting, there are associated costs and risks, albeit less obvious.  They are less important 
(and might be negligible) for simple, one-time transactions where alternate suppliers are readily 
available.  They can be critically important when the outsourcing arrangement is such that there 
is only one supplier readily available in a complex and lengthy relationship.   
Hence, the decision to outsource must weigh production cost savings against the costs 
and risks associated with a critical source of supply being outside the firm’s control.  Those are 
                                                
29 This is a manifestation of what’s sometimes called “bounded rationality.” 
30 BMC may stay mum, intending to force concessions from M&P later.  However, BMC may have no intentions of 
bad faith, but distrusts M&P’s intentions.  BMC may therefore preserve this option for opportunistic behavior as a 
hedge against bad behavior on the part of M&P. 
31 This is sometimes called “tapered integration.” 
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generally referred to as the transactions cost of the outsourcing relationship.  Thus, outsourcing 
is preferred only if the total costs are less than the costs of production with the firm’s (in-house, 
organic) assets.  That is, a firm should outsource only if the following is true:  
Cost of in-house production > Outsourcing + Transactions Costs. 
2.D.  Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
Any problem-solving process inevitably involves comparison of alternatives.  Sometimes 
this is easy; one alternative may provide more advantages (benefits or effectiveness) than all 
the others, while having fewer disadvantages (costs and risks).  That alternative is clearly best 
(being “dominant”).  It may also be that a number of alternatives may have equal cost (or 
effectiveness) with differing effectiveness (or cost).  In that case, the alternative with greatest 
effectiveness (or least cost) is clearly best. 
A more difficult case arises when there are alternatives in which attaining higher 
effectiveness (or lower cost) means finding an alternative with higher cost (or lower 
effectiveness).  Then, the basic assessment question involves a determination of willingness to 
incur higher costs to achieve higher levels of effectiveness.  One way of assessing alternatives 
based on a willingness to pay is Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA). 
CBA is a well-defined method to “appraise an investment project which includes all 
social and financial costs and benefits.”32  It is the subject of extensive literature that includes 
standard textbooks such as Boardman.  The basic foundation of standard CBA methods is total 
willingness to pay.  The basic criterion for the assessment is simple (perhaps deceptively so): 
Net Benefit = Benefits – Costs.33 
The complicated task is finding all the benefits and costs, which entails a detailed and 
systematic analysis.  One industry standard for the major steps in a well-done CBA comes from 
Boardman, and is summarized as follows: 
a) Specify the set of alternative projects. 
b) Decide whose costs and benefits count.  Who has “standing,” or is a legitimate 
stakeholder? 
c) Catalog impacts, and select metrics. 
d) Predict the impacts over the life of the project. 
e) Attach monetary values to all impacts. 
f) Discount benefits and costs for each alternative to Present Values (PV). 
g) Calculate the Net Present Value (NPV) for each alternative. 
h) Perform an appropriate sensitivity analysis. 
i) Make a best-value recommendation based on the NPV and the sensitivity analysis. 
                                                
32 From a dictionary of economics compiled by Bannock, et al. 
33 One immediate complication is that subtracting costs from benefits in any meaningful sense means that the two 
terms are stated in common units.  The main task in conducting a CBA is putting all the dimensions of cost and 
benefit into monetary units. 
 =
=
===================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=íÜÉ=ÑçìåÇ~íáçå=Ñçê=áååçî~íáçå======== - 249 - 
=
=
CBAs can be performed on both projects and alternatives (bundles of projects) when 
formulating investment strategies (including Product Support Strategies).34   
Completed CBAs can then support decisions, using the following general rules: 
a) A project is worth doing (valid) if its net benefits are positive: i.e., benefits exceed 
costs. 
b) A project that can be undertaken at various levels should be expanded as long as 
incremental benefits cover incremental costs. 
c) The alternative (or strategy) with highest net benefit offers best value and is, 
therefore, preferred. 
While all the above is fairly straightforward, there are many devils in the details.  As 
Boardman (among others) points out, a CBA can cost one million dollars and take one year.  
Thus, a large-scale CBA should be undertaken only if the value of the information expected can 
outweigh the associated cost and potential delays. 
Chapter 3.  Practical Foundations 
3A. Business Case Analysis 
As part of making DOD decisions more efficient, the art of Business Case Analysis 
(BCA) has become a major, and required, part of systems-acquisition and systems-
management processes.  As one OSD source puts it, “a properly prepared business case 
represents an effective tool to improve the decision making process and foster timely and 
accurate decisions” (DUSD [Logistics]).   
BCAs are regarded as a major, and necessary, tool for program managers.  For 
example, OSD directs a Product Support Strategy (PSS) prior to Milestone B for any ACAT1 
program.  The PSS is, in turn, the foundation for a BCA to be completed by Milestone C 
(Wynne).  Some extant OSD guidance goes further, and describes the BCA as “an integral part 
of every competent manager’s decision process” (DUSD [Logistics]). 
Business Case Analyses are also useful outside DoD and the Executive Branch.  To 
quote a recent report from the Legislative Branch concerning the F/A-22:  “GAO recommends 
that DoD complete a new business case that determines the continued need for the F/A-22 and 
the number of aircraft required for its air-to-air and air-to-ground roles based on capabilities, 
need, alternatives, and constraints of future defense spending department wide” (GAO, 
emphasis added). 
There is considerable help in the form of BCA templates and examples available both in 
the DoD and the commercial sector.  There is, moreover, much in common among these 
sources.  One of these guides provides the following template for constructing a BCA: Executive 
Summary, Boundaries of the Case, Discussion of Alternatives, Comparison of Alternatives, 
Conclusions, Recommendations & Issues (DUSD[Logistics]).  A more detailed template follows 
in Table 3A1 below—which is a recommended table of contents for a BCA report. 
                                                
34 A short digression on terminology:  In CBA terminology, a group of projects constitutes an alternative.  In Business 
Cost Analysis (BCA) terminology, a portfolio of initiatives constitutes an alternative—“initiative” being a reasonable 
analog of “project.” 
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TABLE 3.A.1.  A BCA Template 
CHAPTER SECTION SUBSECTION 
1.  Executive Summary   
2.  Boundaries Of The 
Business Case 
  
 2.1. Goals and Vision  
 2.2. Context & Perspective  
 2.3. Functional Performance & 
Metrics 
 
 2.4. Initiatives Considered  
 2.5. Alternatives Considered  
 2.6. Key Assumptions  
 2.7. Status Quo Activity Model  
3. Discussion Of Alternatives    
 3.1. Alternative 1  
  3.1.1. Functional Performance 
Description 
  3.1.2. Performance Impact & Metrics 
  3.1.3. Technical Architecture 
  3.1.4. Cost Projections 
  3.1.5. Risk Assessment 
 3.2. Alternative 2 …  
4. Comparison Of Alternatives   
 4.1. Functional  
 4.2. Performance  
 4.3. Cost  
5. Conclusions, 
Recommendations & Issues 
  
What They Are Intended to Do 
As current guidance makes plain, BCAs should provide a systematic analysis of 
management alternatives which is clearly communicated to the relevant stakeholders and 
decision-makers.  Fundamentally, therefore, the BCA is a method for structuring and solving 
problems.  BCAs are considered especially useful for formulation of change and modification 
strategies, as well for life-cycle management in general.   
The nature and intention of BCA methodology is, in fact, simpler than the currently-
fashionable mystique about its usefulness suggests.  BCAs are, quite simply, a method for 
structuring and solving problems—no more and certainly no less.  The BCA template in Table 
3.A.1 above integrates well into the problem-solving outline provided in Section 2A above.  This 
is indicated in Figure 3.A.1. 
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BCA As Problem Solving Method
Business Case Analysis
• Boundaries of Case
• Discussion of 
Alternatives








• Consequences of 
Alternatives
• Assessment of 
Alternatives
• Choice of Best 
Alternative
 
Figure 3.A.1.  Business Case Analysis Correspondence with Other Problem-Solving Methods. 
Sources: DUSD (Logistics) and Stokey. 
As such valuable problem-solving techniques, high-quality BCAs can provide program 
managers with the following advantages: 
d) credible assessment of alternative strategies, 
e) clear rationale for decisions, 
f) valid, transparent and persuasive analysis for reviewing agencies. 
However, realization of that potential is much more likely with tools of analysis suitable 
for practical Business Case Analyses.  It appears to this observer that Program Managers have 
much more guidance about BCA reports as documents than they have about BCAs as 
analyses.  While it’s easy to mandate BCAs and call for sound analyses, the task of developing 
the analytical foundations is explicitly left to the services (Wynne).  This has the virtue of not 
requiring one analytical form to suit all users.  But requiring BCAs without an assurance of 
sound analytical foundations poses the danger of BCAs that have the same depth as 
PowerPoint slides. 
In short, Program Managers can consider BCAs as documents to be a settled matter.  
Moreover, the standard Table of Contents integrates nicely into the analytical processes needed 
to underpin a useful BCA.  Guidance for doing the foundational analysis is much less complete.  
Therefore, Program Managers may well find it useful to devote significant attention to the 
analytical methods behind the submitted BCA report and the associated briefing charts.  
Chapter 2 discussed major theoretical foundations.  The remainder of this chapter considers 
some of the practical foundations of the BCA as analysis. 
3B. Input-Output Methods in DOD 
3.B.1. DRM (QuickCost) 
One method of tracing relationships of various programs within the defense budget is the 
QUICK COST Defense Force Cost Model, based on the Defense Resource Management Model 
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maintained by the Congressional Budget Office.  QUICK COST features aggregated Budget 
Authority based on the budget projections.  Actual budget details are kept in the Program 
Elements (PEs), which are classified.  QUICK COST details are found in Aggregated Elements 
(AEs), which are unclassified aggregations of the PEs. This information is, however, still quite 
detailed. 
The QUICK COST model directly estimates Operations and Support (O&S) costs 
associated with a given force structure.  It does not provide direct estimates of changes in 
research and development, procurement and construction, or other funding not directly linked to 
force structure.  However, the model’s data base provides historical data for items in these 
categories.   
The model’s structure is based on Primary, Related and Support AEs.  The model 
begins with the Primary AEs, which are directly associated with combat forces.  Related AEs, in 
turn, are linked to associated Primary AEs.  Support AEs are basically infrastructure, such as 
base operating support, central training activities, and logistics activities.  The Support AEs (as 
the name implies) support the Primary and Related AEs within the model’s hierarchy.  Taken as 
an input-output model, QUICK COST involves “shipments” from Related AEs to Primary, and 
from Support AEs to Related and Direct. 
The QUICKCOST scheme is summarized in the following table, readily seen as a 
simplified version of the military input-output model discussed above.  The P, R and S 
subscripts represent the Primary, Related and Support classes, respectively, and the term 
Operational Capability replaces Final Demand. 
Table 3.B.1. Notional Quick Cost Input-Output Table 
AE Class Primary Related Support Operational 
Capability 
Total Output 
Primary 0 0 0 FP QP 
Related aRP aRR 0 0 QR 
Support aSP aSR aSS 0 QS 
An important feature of the model is treatment of fixed and variable costs.  Primary AEs 
vary directly with their associated forces, with all costs thus variable.  Related and Support AEs 
are tied to the Primary AEs through proxy variables; changes in military pay within Primary AEs 
are taken to represent the change in the overall level of activities.  For the Related and Support 
AEs, the Model contains (a) fixed and variable costs based on "historical" experience and (b) all 
costs variable.35  The historical fixed/variable factors are (not surprisingly) based on past 
experience—with changes in forces being, for the most part, relatively small in any given year 
and gradual over time.  The all-costs-variable approach assumes all Related and Support AEs 
vary directly with associated combat forces.  For purposes of Business Case Analysis of organic 
                                                
35 One simple, but useful, explanation of variable and fixed costs is that there are (a) overhead costs associated with 
these AEs, and (b) resources associated directly with those AEs’ “outputs.”  Thus, for example, a small change in 
end-strength would result in a change in training requirements.  However, it would not result in a change in the base 
structure of the training commands.  Therefore, it’s reasonable to believe there are substantial overhead costs not 
affected by small changes in end-strength.  However, if there are large percentage changes in end-strength, one 
would expect significant changes in the size of the training establishment and other personnel support commands. 
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vs. contractor support, historical factors seem best.  Such decisions taken individually will have 
only minor impacts on overall force and personnel structure. 
There is difficulty in using this model directly for BCAs that assess organic vs. contractor 
support, however.  The DRM model is designed to relate support and infrastructure 
expenditures to operational forces.  That is, it’s well structured to give reasonable estimates of 
the budgetary and manpower implications of changes in force structure.  However, it’s not well 
structured to consider the changes associated with substituting contractor for organic support.  
One of the major problems is insufficient “granularity” of the data structure. 
In terms of providing insights into the issue at hand, QUICKCOST seems something of a 
dead end.  This model generally lacks the precision (“granularity”) to credibly capture the 
indirect savings from outsourcing support activities.  It does, however, illustrate the feasibility of 
constructing a large-scale model of resource flows within DoD based on input-output principles. 
3.B.2. Manpower Calculations 
The Navy’s manpower requirements system is laid out in OPNAV INST 1000.16J and 
related publications.  Conceptually, this document looks quite similar to an input-output 
approach.  The Instruction discusses the manpower requirements and authorization system, 
providing “guidance and procedures to develop, review, approve, and implement total force 
manpower requirements and authorizations for naval activities” (para. 1.a.).36   
Manpower requirements for individual units (or activities) are based on the minimum 
manpower needed to satisfactorily perform the tasks required to accomplish the unit mission.  
Manpower requirements are stated in both quantitative and qualitative terms.  The nature of the 
tasks determines manpower quality, generally specified in terms such as ratings, grades, 
subspecialties and classification codes.  The nature of the tasks to be performed is determined 
by the unit’s Missions, Functions and Tasks (MFT) or the Required Operational 
Capability/Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE).  The scale of those tasks (workload) 
determines the quantity of manpower required.   
Workload determinations are based on Industrial Engineering methods, or some other 
“justifiable” technique (para. 4.a.).  With each task is associated a justifiable number of work 
hours.  With each type of unit is associated a standard work week (Appendix C).  For example, 
a shore activity generally has a standard work week of 40 hours; standard work week for ships 
at sea (in the Instruction’s specified conditions) is 81 hours.  The standard “productive” work 
week ashore is 33.38 hours for planning purposes—the remaining 6.62 hours being assigned to 
training, service “diversion,” leave and holidays.  Suppose a shore activity must, for some 
reason, maintain a watch of three persons continuously (168 hours per week).  The manpower 
required to accomplish this task is 15.10 (168*3/33.38= 15.10).   
Thus, the manpower requirements of a naval activity are pieced together from a number 
of these building blocks.  The activity’s manpower requirement is recorded in the appropriate 
Activity Manpower Document (AMD), which is the sole authority for such requirements.37  A 
change in a unit’s workload or nature of tasks (among other things) necessitates determining 
                                                
36 What follows is a somewhat oversimplified characterization of a complex process. 
37 Source documents for the AMD, in turn, include the SMD, SQMD, FMD and SMR, as appropriate.  These 
acronyms are defined in App. A to Encl. 1 of the Instruction. 
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the appropriate changes in the AMD (para. 5.b.)  Total force requirements are tracked using the 
Total Force Manpower Management System (TFMMS), which is the “single, authoritative data 
base” for manpower requirements (para. 5.a.)  The authorization process is done bottom-up 
(zero based), and the process is specifically untied from resource constraints—including end-
strengths. 
While the requirements process is relatively well specified, the authorization process is 
necessarily less so.  Authorizations are specifically balanced against end-strength constraints 
(both quantitative and qualitative).  Authorizations are also tracked with AMDs and the TFMMS.  
Having a validated manpower requirement is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a 
corresponding authorization.  Thus, the requirements total constitutes an upper boundary for an 
activity’s authorized total.  Manpower authorizations, among other things, provide the foundation 
for personnel assignment.  Therefore, as a practical matter, a manpower authorization is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for someone being assigned.  Thus, authorized 
personnel is an upper boundary for assigned personnel; assigned personnel (except in unusual 
or temporary circumstances) cannot exceed authorized personnel 
Conceptually, the manpower requirements process looks very much like the input-output 
perspective discussed in Section 2B above—especially in the quantitative dimension.  Some 
activities’ missions are directly related to providing operational capability (a good analog of “final 
demand”).  Other activities support the operational units.  A portion of that support overall is 
related more or less directly to the operational units’ mission; depot-level maintenance is one 
example.  Another portion involves support of the personnel assigned to the operational unit.  
Suppose, for example, an F-18 squadron changes the number of aircraft assigned.38  As a 
result, the AMD would be recalculated, based (in all likelihood) on the change in the scale of 
tasks to be performed.  At the same time, the supporting units would recalculate their AMDs, 
since the scale of tasks in the operational unit (quite likely) changes the scale of tasks for all the 
supporting units.  If, as is generally the case, those supporting units are, in turn, supported by 
other units, then still more units would recalculate.  (This is the “multiplier” property of input-
output models discussed in 2B above.)   
Likewise, if that same F-18 squadron were to outsource some of its functions to 
contractor personnel, then manpower requirements for the squadron would be recalculated for 
the AMD.  For supporting units, tasks directly associated with the squadron’s operational tasks 
would remain the same.  However, supporting activities’ tasks associated with the F-18 military 
personnel levels would be recalculated.  Thus, the military manpower reductions associated 
with outsourced support functions are not limited to the unit in question. 
It is possible to visualize a version of TFMMS (tied to AMDs) that allow such calculations 
to be done quickly, cheaply and accurately.  However, it is unlikely that the manpower data 
bases can provide such services.  The extent to which the AMDs of operational units are 
explicitly tied to the AMDs of their supporting units is not clear.  Likewise, it is not clear the 
extent to which changes in AMDs are explicitly tied to the TFMMS.  (Determining the current 
state of such linkages would be an interesting topic for further research, but is beyond the scope 
of this particular project.)  Moreover, data bases as MIS support tools are no better than the raw 
data given them.  Unless capabilities are exercised, it is likely the necessary information is 
                                                
38 Some suspension of disbelief is requested.  It’s unlikely that current Navy policies or existing legislation would 
permit outsourcing in this form.  The example is chosen for expository clarity.  It’s possible to choose an example 
further from the tip of the proverbial spear and make the same point, but with perhaps less clarity. 
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either inaccurate (not having been checked through actual use) or simply missing.  An expert 
source characterizes this process as a sort of “trickle down” effect from one activity to another, 
even with major changes, and a process that does not take place automatically.39 
What is clear is that the TFMMS, AMDs and related data sources are not intended for 
the purpose of “what if” excursions based on changes in the scale of unit missions.  As the 
Instruction makes clear, they are specifically designed to track unit manpower requirements 
bottom-up; they are also intended to reflect the top-down allocation of resource constraints 
(such as end-strengths) against those requirements.  As such, they are well designed for 
purposes such as supporting inputs to resource allocation processes (in the case of PPBES) 
and providing data for reports requested by the Congress.   
3C.  Outsourcing Methods 
3C.1. A-76 Process 
OMB Circular A-76 documents policies of the US Government for the “performance of 
commercial activities.”40  It requires activities which government personnel perform to be 
classified as “commercial” or “inherently-governmental.”  All activities in the latter category are 
to be performed with government personnel (organic assets).  Activities in the former category 
are “subject to the forces of competition.”   
A sorting between the commercial and inherently-governmental activities is detailed in 
Attachment A (Inventory Process).  Attachment B specifies (to a fair level of detail) the process 
for competition (Public-Private Competition).41  Attachment C contains rules and procedures for 
calculating costs (Calculating Public-Private Competition Costs).   
The Process in Brief 
The standard competition process consists of a number of stages, which can be 
summarized as the following:42   
g) Inventory agency activities, classify them as commercial or governmental, and 
determine how the competition(s) are organized (“bundled”).   
h) Announce intention to undertake an outsourcing study, both to the affected 
government work force and to potential commercial sources. 
i) Develop and announce the terms of the competition to include expectations 
(Performance Work Statement, PWS), various study teams, and a quality assurance 
plan (QASP).  Criteria for source selection are also specified. 
j) Issue a solicitation, or Request for Proposal, seeking bids from the commercial 
sector. 
                                                
39 Based on conversations with CDR William Hatch, USN (now retired). 
40 This discussion borrows heavily from the Circular, version of 29 May 2003, and the Powell thesis. 
41 Actually, at least two competition processes—the streamlined process is discussed in Attachment B, Section C; the 
standard process in Section D. 
42 Stated in A-76, Attachment B, displayed visually in Figure B2.  Stevens provides an excellent comparison of the 
current version of A-76 with its predecessors. 
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k) Develop the in-house alternative (Most Efficient Organization).  This consists of a 
management plan, cost estimate, performance plan, and transition plan.  This 
alternative is one of the finalists. 
l) Compare the Most Efficient Organization (in-house) with the qualified commercial 
proposals (outsourced) generally in terms of cost of meeting the terms of the PWS.43  
(However, the contractor’s proposal must meet a minimum cost differential: 10 
percent or $10 million (whichever is less).) 
m) Award the contract (issuing agreement), after appeal if applicable. 
n) Transition to the in-house organization (if applicable) or to the winning commercial 
source. 
o) Conduct post-award contract administration (if applicable) and quality assurance. 
The Essentials of the Process 
The provisions of A-76 are not formulated with organic vs. contractor support of new 
systems in mind.  However, the essentials of the process provide useful benchmarks, 
regardless of the outsourcing decision at hand. These essentials are listed below: 
p) Fully understand the context of the decision.  The performance of the activity in 
question affects capability (perhaps directly) and the performance of other 
organizations.  Performance categories and impacts of that performance should be 
carefully and specifically noted.  In the A-76 process, this is embodied in the 
Performance Work Statement. 
q) Fully develop the relevant alternatives.  
r) Specify the consequences of selecting each of them.  In particular, A-76 provides 
guidance for determining full costs of the alternatives. 
s) Assess the consequences.  The A-76 base case for comparison and assessment is 
cost of meeting the standards of the PWS.   
t) Make a decision and implement it.  This phase includes awarding the contract or 
issuing an agreement.  It also includes any appeals, and actions associated with 
executing the PWS with the chosen provider. 
3C.2. An Outsourcing Risk Assessment Method 
The Powell thesis proposes a method for managers to assess the risks associated with 
a proposed outsourcing action.  Basically, aspects of the new relationship are related with a 
stoplight scheme.  For example, if there is a high degree of asset specificity involved, there 
would be a red light in that category, and a higher degree of risk is indicated.  Powell intended 
the light scheme to increase visibility of areas where management attention is important, and 
where managers ought to focus their risk-reduction efforts. 
That application is certainly valid, but there’s another wrinkle.  The study of Transactions 
Cost Economics indicates that risk-reduction measures (even if highly effective) are not risk-
                                                
43 There are provisions in A-76 for possibly not selecting the lowest-cost alternative (“tradeoff” source selection).  This 
section is based on discussions in the Circular, and the Powell thesis. 
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elimination panaceas.  Accordingly, one can expect an overall outsourcing action with a large 
number of assessed red and yellow lights will be more costly and risky during its execution, 
even with due diligence in risk reduction. 
What follows is a variation of Powell’s stoplight scheme. 
a. Asset Specificity. 
RED.  Source becomes specialized, with no close substitutes or competitors 
readily available.  Example: only qualified supplier for a specific, highly-specialized 
task—such as suppliers of spare parts for aging weapon systems. 
GREEN.  Routine (non-specialized) goods or tasks; competitors or close 
substitutes readily available.  Example: purchase of standard commercial items, such as 
paper clips and other office supplies.   
b. Complexity. 
RED.  A large-scale task covering a large geographic area.  Complexity of task 
severely limits qualified bidders.  Example: large-scale, complex IT support; such as 
NMCI. 
GREEN.  A simple, routine task or standard product.  A large number of qualified 
bidders.  Example:  office supplies. 
c. Length of Relationship. 
RED.  A long-term relationship, which strains ability to foresee problems during 
original contract negotiations.  Complexity and asset specificity exacerbate this problem.  
Example: IT support, such as NMCI. 
GREEN.  Outsourcing is a one-time transaction, or can be structured as a series 
of one-time transactions.  Example:  purchase of office supplies. 
d. Frequency. 
RED.  Specialized, complex task or service from which there is significant 
learning-by-doing.  Incumbent contractor has significant competitive advantage over 
potential competitors.  Example: contract maintenance for specialized aircraft, such as 
E-4s. 
GREEN.  Routine, standard task, service or product, in which a number of firms 
have significant expertise.  Example: copy machine repair. 
e. Time Sensitivity. (added) 
RED.  Quick performance of task or delivery of product is essential for 
satisfactory performance.  Example: repair of combat aircraft, or warship subsystems. 
GREEN.  Quick delivery of products or accomplishment of task is not essential 
for satisfactory performance.  Satisfactory performance can include some delays.  
Example: copy machine repairs. 
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f. Operational Significance. (added) 
RED.  Unsatisfactory performance significantly degrades operational capability or 
compromises safety.  Example:  repair of combat aircraft or warship subsystems. 
GREEN.  Unsatisfactory performance involves, at most, administrative 
inconvenience and longer time to accomplish routine tasks.  No compromise of 
operational readiness or safety.  Examples: delays in copy machine repairs and 
temporary lack of office supplies. 
Chapter 4.  Recommendations for Program Mangers 
As noted, one significant problem facing the Services and Program Managers is the 
mandate to develop analytical methodology for Business Case Analyses.  This essay has 
discussed some of those foundations—starting with theoretical methods and proceeding to the 
practical manifestations in a defense environment. 
Overall, the analytical tool box is certainly not empty.  However, it’s also not full and 
probably not stocked to minimum essential levels.  Basically, it appears theoretical methods 
have not yet been translated into practical methods suitable for defense managers and the 
acquisition work force.  There is good reason to believe that fulfilling the analytical methods 
mandate will entail additional work. 
Interim Thoughts on Assessing Organic vs. Contractor Support 
Waiting for analytical study completion can result in long program delays.  Waiting for a 
fully-satisfactory analytical foundation for those studies can similarly result in eternal program 
delays.  This report, therefore, offers some recommendations for BCAs done in the interim. 
A useful starting point for assessing contractor vs. organic support alternatives is the 
framework contained in OMB Circular A-76.  A-76 and supplementing directives arguably do not 
apply to development of Product Support Strategies. 44  However, they do contain a useful 
framework for this particular variation of the outsourcing decision.  That is, even if A-76 is not an 
applicable directive for Product Support Strategies, Product Managers can likely profit from 
considering the provisions of A-76 as a source of advice. Accordingly, the following suggestions 
are offered. 
1. Get the objectives straight.  If in doubt, over-invest in the Performance Work Statement, 
or whatever analog is used.45   
2. Thoroughly develop the alternatives.  This includes careful consideration of the following 
questions: 
a. What’s the best process for developing a contractor-based support function? 
b. Will the organic alternative be based on business-as-usual, perhaps using 
existing manpower requirements?  Or will it be some variation of the Most 
Efficient Organization? 
                                                
44 To quote an old saying, however, determination is above this observer’s pay grade. 
45 Term from A-76. 
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3. Carefully assess the alternatives.  For organic vs. contractor support, this includes the 
following considerations: 
a. How will the manpower effects for activities supporting the outsourced functions 
be considered?  It appears the current manpower data system is not designed to 
compute these “what if” estimates in reasonable amounts of time or at 
reasonable degrees of accuracy.  It’s recommended instead that BCAs include 
some rule of thumb, such as a 15% overhead rule.46 
b. In assessing organic manpower costs, what percentage of manpower 
requirements will be supported with an authorization?47  If there’s no 
authorization, there’s no fill and no expenditure of resources. 
c. Be sure to consider transactions costs and risks associated with the contractor-
support alternative.  One reasonable approach to assessing both costs and risks 
is using Powell’s stoplight scheme. 
Proposal for Consideration 
As stated above, there’s considerable reason to believe the analytical framework for BCAs 
is incomplete, due more to the availability of practical rather than theoretical foundations for that 
analysis.  Therefore, the following proposal is worth some consideration. 
First, assemble an interdisciplinary team with knowledge of underlying theoretical 
foundations, DoD institutions, and Navy needs.  Obvious places to look for such individuals 
include AFIT, CNA, IDA, LMI, NPS and RAND.  Second, involve these researchers as 
consultants in actual BCAs in order to improve the BCAs themselves, but also to advance 
needs analyses for the analytical foundation.  Third, assemble a case study and lessons-
learned literature based on this experience.  Fourth, identify and fund research into applications 
of basic theory to BCAs, with a view to developing analytical templates.  Finally, translate those 
templates into practical instructions for acquisition professionals.48 
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